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Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations
to Avoid Antitrust Challenges
Tara Adams Ragone
I.

INTRODUCTION

Faced with increasingly inefficient, costly, poor quality,
1
fragmented medical care for their citizens, several states are
adopting accountable care organization (ACO) models of care
delivery to improve access to quality health care while trying to bend
2
the cost curve.
ACOs are not one-size-fits-all delivery systems,

J.D., New York University School of Law; Research Fellow & Lecturer in Law,
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton Hall University School of
Law. The author was a member of a working group in New Jersey that collaborated
to identify issues to assist the State in its drafting of regulations to implement its
Medicaid Accountable Care Organization (ACO) legislation, which is the focus of
this article. The author is indebted to the members of the working group for their
insights on antitrust and other matters, especially John V. Jacobi, Dorothea Dix
Professor of Health Law and Policy at Seton Hall Law School, who provided essential
guidance throughout the researching and drafting of this article; Elizabeth G. Litten,
Partner, Fox Rothschild LLP; and Naomi Wyatt, Director of Legal and Governmental
Affairs, Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers. Thomas L. Greaney, CoDirector, Center for Health Law Studies, and Chester A. Myers Professor of Law, St.
Louis University School of Law, also generously shared his deep expertise in antitrust
matters. John Barry and Jonathan Keller, Seton Hall University School of Law Class
of 2013, provided helpful research assistance in preparation to present this topic at
the Law Review’s Symposium in Fall 2011.
1
See JAMES C. COSGROVE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-291R,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES DIFFERED ON THE ADEQUACY
OF GUIDANCE FOR COLLABORATION AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 1 (Mar. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589393.pdf [hereinafter “GAO”].
2
See, e.g., TRICIA MCGINNIS & DAVID MARC SMALL, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE
STRATEGIES, INC., POLICY BRIEF: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICAID:
EMERGING PRACTICES TO GUIDE PROGRAM DESIGN 1 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Creating_ACOs_in_Medicaid.pdf (noting that ACOs
“are gaining momentum in Medicaid”); ANN MARIE MARCIARILLE ET AL., BERKELEY L.
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & SOC. POLICY, POLICY BRIEF: BREAKING DOWN
BARRIERS TO CREATING SAFETY-NET ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: STATE
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES 16–19 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/FINAL_assembled_SafetyNetACO.08171.pdf (describing accountable care-related reform efforts in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, Vermont, and Washington); KITTY PURINGTON ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. FOR
STATE HEALTH POLICY, ON THE ROAD TO BETTER VALUE: STATE ROLES IN PROMOTING

1443

RAGONE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1444

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/22/2012 1:39 PM

[Vol. 42:1443

however, and states are testing different models to see what works
3
best for their needs. Some states are focusing their efforts on
developing Medicaid ACOs, which may “offer a useful framework
through which payers, providers, and communities can radically
restructure care delivery to improve care for low-income patients and
4
reduce system costs.”
New Jersey is on the forefront of state efforts to develop safety
net ACOs to provide essential health care to their most vulnerable
populations. On August 18, 2011, New Jersey enacted the Medicaid
5
Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project. Although
this pilot project shares some features with other ACOs developed at
the state and national level, it has been described as “unique in its
6
ground-up, community-based approach” pursuant to which a single
ACO serves a defined geographic area. While this approach brings
the community together to address entrenched, systemic
fragmentation, the degree of market share and collaboration among
7
potential competitors raises antitrust concerns.
This Article explores two possible responses to these antitrust
concerns: (1) clinical integration and (2) the state action doctrine.
New Jersey is presently drafting regulations to implement its
demonstration project. By structuring Medicaid ACOs to reflect
these doctrines, the State should be able to mitigate anticompetitive
threats and avoid federal antitrust liability. Failure to do so, however,
could jeopardize the success of the pilot because providers are less
inclined to seek to form an ACO if they face potential or even
8
uncertain antitrust liability. ACOs and antitrust regulation share the
ACCOUNTABLE
CARE
ORGANIZATIONS,
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report
/2011/Feb/On%20the%20Road%20to%20Better%20Value/1479_Purington_on_th
e_road_to_better_value_ACOs_FINAL.pdf (examining the development of ACO
models in Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont,
and Washington “to promote better value in health care spending”).
3
CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 1.
4
Id. at 1 (outlining essential requirements for safety-net ACOs and reviewing
Medicaid-focused ACO programs in process throughout the country, including
Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Utah).
5
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.1–8.15.
6
CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 7.
7
This Article focuses on federal antitrust law because New Jersey exempted
activities undertaken pursuant to the Medicaid ACO demonstration from State
antitrust laws. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g).
8
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Grossman, et al., Alert: House Judiciary Hearing Provides Few
Answers, HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST AND LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (Cozen O’Connor), Dec.
13, 2010, http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/antitrust-121310.pdf
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common goal of controlling costs while improving quality, and thus
New Jersey should be able to harmonize its pilot with antitrust
principles.
II. OVERVIEW OF NEW JERSEY’S MEDICAID ACO LEGISLATION
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO demonstration project, which
garnered support from a broad coalition of businesses, hospitals,
healthcare providers, and consumer groups, is a three-year pilot to
9
test multi-stakeholder, geographic-based Medicaid ACOs.
The
statutory aims include increasing access to care while improving
health outcomes and quality, as measured by objective metrics and
10
patient experience of care, and reducing unnecessary care.
Participating providers will continue to receive Medicaid fee-forservice or managed care reimbursements for their professional
11
services. As an incentive to coordinate care, the ACO will be eligible
to share in any savings that it generates above a certain threshold, if it
12
meets certain quality benchmarks.
13
The statute establishes several eligibility requirements. A nonprofit coalition of providers from a given geographic area, with a
governing board that includes community input, will apply to the
14
State for recognition as a Medicaid ACO.
To ensure regional
collaboration, each ACO’s application must have the support of one
hundred percent of the general hospitals and at least seventy-five
percent of the primary care providers within the ACO’s designated
15
area. Although participating providers may collaborate with other
16
ACOs, only one Medicaid ACO is permitted in each geographic
17
area. The statute requires each ACO to submit quality improvement
(reporting that health care providers recently testified before Congress “that clear
guidance from federal agencies is urgently required to reduce the cost, complexity,
and uncertainty that have stymied ACO formation to date and impede potential
participants’ willingness to join these organizations in the future”).
9
Research and Advocacy: Medicaid ACO Demonstration Projects, CAMDEN COALITION
OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, http://www.camdenhealth.org/data-research/medicaidacos-in-nj/.
10
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(d); CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2,
at 15.
11
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.1(f), 8.12.
12
See § 30:4D-8.5.
13
§§ 30:4D-8.4–8.5.
14
§§ 30:4D-8.3–8.5.
15
§ 30:4D-8.4(c)(3).
16
§ 30:4D-8.3(a).
17
§ 30:4D-8.4(b).
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and gainsharing plans to the State that advance the statutory goals of
improving “quality and accessibility while reducing or stabilizing the
18
costs of medical care throughout a region.” To this end, the State is
only permitted to approve “gainsharing plans that promote:
improvements in health outcomes and quality of care, as measured by
objective benchmarks as well as patient experience of care; expanded
access to primary and behavioral health care services; and the
reduction of unnecessary and inefficient costs associated with care
rendered to Medicaid recipients residing in the ACO’s designated
19
area.” The statute identifies a variety of criteria for the State to
consider in conducting this review, including whether the plan
promotes care coordination through multi-disciplinary teams;
expansion of medical homes; increased patient medication
adherence; use of health information technology and sharing of
20
health information; and use of open-access scheduling.
III. ANTITRUST CONCERNS
Increased regional coordination and shared accountability are
central to the goals of New Jersey’s demonstration project.
21
Collaboration, however, can lead to less competition.
But a
commitment to protecting competition is the heart of antitrust law—
a conviction that competition provides consumers with choices that
22
can lead to quality and value.
As then U.S. Assistant Attorney
General Christine Varney described:
[t]he ultimate goal of health care reform is to harness the
power of competition, together with regulation, to expand
coverage, improve quality, and control the cost of health
care for all Americans. The role of antitrust is to ensure
that competition is preserved and protected, so that it is
23
there to be harnessed.
18

§ 30:4D-8.1(c); see also id. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(4).
§ 30:4D-8.5(d).
20
§ 30:4D-8.5(b)(1).
21
GAO, supra note 1, at 2.
22
TAYLOR BURKE ET AL., ALIGNING FORCES FOR QUALITY, HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM
AND ANTITRUST LAW: THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF HEALTH INFORMATION SHARING BY
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURERS 1 (July 2009), available at
http://www.stateinnovation.org/Publications/All-Publications/Report-2009AligningForcesforQuality-HealthSystemR.aspx. Although there are three primary
federal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act is most relevant for purposes of ACO antitrust analysis.
23
Christine A. Varney, Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar
19
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Thus, although ACOs and antitrust regulation share the goals of
expanding coverage, improving quality, and controlling costs, aspects
of the ACO model can raise anti-competitive concerns. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), as the Federal agencies with
overlapping authority to enforce the nation’s antitrust laws
24
(“Agencies”), want to ensure “that coordination and integration
among health care providers encourage innovation and efficiency
25
without harming competition.”
There is some concern that the integration that ACOs
encourage will lead to fewer competitors in the markets, which could
26
then increase the market power of ACOs. With increased market
27
power comes the potential to raise prices to uncompetitive levels.
Association/American Health Lawyers Association Antitrust in Healthcare
Conference 3 (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public
/speeches/258898.htm (quoted in Ken Glazer & Catherine A. LaRose, Accountable
Care Organizations: Antitrust Business as Usual, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec1
1_glazer_12_21f.authcheckdam.pdf).
24
GAO, supra note 1, at 2; MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPETITION, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 20 n.1 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/aco_competition.pdf.
25
Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Healthcare Providers, Insurers and Patients:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,
111th
Cong.
2d
Sess.
(2010),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-157_62658.PDF (testimony
of Sharis A. Pozen, Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
26
See Richard M. Sheffler et al., Accountable Care Organizations and Antitrust, 307
JAMA 1493 (2012); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable
Care Organizations and Competition Policy 16 (Aug. 4, 2012) (working paper),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2124097
[hereinafter “Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers”]; cf. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed.
Trade. Comm’n, Remarks before the North Carolina Bar Assoc’n’s Antitrust and
Trade
Regulation
Section
5
(Feb.
9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120209nc-cle.pdf
(noting
that
ACOs
participating in the Federal Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) could
“interface with the antitrust laws in the future” because “as these integrated groups
begin to act in the marketplace, they could potentially gain market power and
reduce competition”).
27
Antitrust Issues for Accountable Care Organizations: Revised Agency Guidance
Spotlights Possible Concerns, ADVISORY (ARNOLD & PORTER LLP) 2, Nov. 2011, available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Antitrust_Issues_
Accountable_Care_Organizations_Revised_Agency_Guidance_Spotlights_Possible_C
oncerns.pdf; see generally Austin Frakt, Simply Put: Market Power, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com
/wordpress/excerpts-from-health-reform-and-market-competition-by-leibenluft-andluft/ (discussing concept of market power for purposes of antitrust law).
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Even where prices are set by government programs, as they are in
28
Medicare and fee-for-service Medicaid, and are therefore not subject
29
to anticompetitive collusion, antitrust regulators may worry about
the impact of reduced competition on output, quality of services, and
30
innovation. For example, it could run afoul of antitrust law for
doctors participating in an ACO to agree to limit business hours or
restrict access to certain services as a means of cost-savings, or for two
hospitals to agree that each would specialize in different fields and
31
neither would compete with the other in these spheres. Similarly,
the Agencies could object to arrangements among potential
competitors that reduce consumer choice or lead to a decrease in the

28

Most New Jersey Medicaid recipients get care through Medicaid managed care
plans (HMOs) rather than fee-for-service Medicaid. See STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEP’T
OF HUMAN SERVS., DIV. OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE & HEALTH SERVS., NJ Medicaid and
Managed Care, http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/;
NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS NEW JERSEY, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
for Medicaid Clients, 4 (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.naminj.org/advocacy/enews
/MedicaidClientFAQsAug192011.pdf; THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,
New
Jersey:
Medicaid
Managed
Care,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=4&sub=56&rgn=32.
The State
pays the HMO a capitation rate, and then the HMO negotiates fee levels with
providers. See generally CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES AND
______________________________,
CONTRACTOR
3,
available
at
http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/hmocontract.pdf (defining capitation as “a contractual agreement through which a
contractor agrees to provide specified health care services to enrollees for a fixed
amount per month”). If providers were to negotiate their reimbursement rates as a
block with the HMOs, they could increase their market power and drive prices to
uncompetitive levels. Thus, as recommended below, New Jersey should prohibit
Medicaid HMO providers in an ACO from colluding to set prices with Medicaid
HMOs.
29
See, e.g., Kevin Outterson, Do ACOs with Market Power Need Relaxed Antitrust
Rules?,
INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST
(Dec,
2,
2010,
1:00
PM),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/do-acos-with-market-power-needrelaxed-antitrust-rules/ (“Medicare-only ACOs should get a stay-out-of-jail free card
as well, since the sole customer is a price-fixer.”).
30
See BURKE ET AL., supra note 22, at 6; cf. Glazer & LaRose, supra note 23, at 2
(noting that “although Medicare reimbursements are subject to set fees for services,
which eliminates the possibility that [a MSSP] ACO might conspire to fix prices for
various services it provides to beneficiaries, the government will still be alert to anticompetitive schemes regarding non-price elements of competition”); see generally
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION 4 (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare
/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [hereinafter “DOSE OF COMPETITION”] (“Non-price
competition can promote higher quality and encourage innovation.”).
31
Glazer & LaRose, supra note 23, at 7–8.
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32

quality of health care.
The Agencies also may worry about the impact New Jersey’s
Medicaid ACOs will have on competition outside of the Medicaid
markets. While it does not violate antitrust law for Medicaid ACO
participants to collectively decide how to divide shared savings earned
by reducing costs while meeting quality benchmarks, it would raise
serious antitrust issues if these potential competitors jointly discussed
33
contracting outside of the ACO context.
In addition, the ACO
arrangement could “make it easier for physicians to exclude potential
34
competitors from entry into the local market.”
To be sure, aspects of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO collaborations
trigger antitrust concerns. In particular, only one Medicaid ACO is
permitted in each defined region, and that ACO must have the
support of all of the hospitals and at least seventy-five percent of the
35
primary care providers in that region. The Agencies may scrutinize
New Jersey’s demonstration project to ensure collaboration in the
Medicaid markets will not reduce quality, innovation, and choice for
both Medicaid and commercial patients.
IV. RESPONSES TO ANTITRUST CONCERNS
New Jersey has strong responses to the antitrust concerns raised
by its Medicaid ACO pilot project. For one, collaboration is a means
to an end—improved quality of care at lower costs. The pilot
requires clinical integration to achieve these goals, which, as
discussed in Section IV.A below, reduces the anticompetitive threat
from collaboration. Further, even if the Agencies do not find that
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs are sufficiently clinically integrated to
balance the threat to competition, the State specifically intended that
32

Antitrust Issues for Accountable Care Organizations, supra note 27.
Austin Frakt, Excerpts from “Health Reform and Market Competition,” by Leibenluft
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
25,
2010),
and
Luft,
INCIDENTAL
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/excerpts-from-health-reform-andmarket-competition-by-leibenluft-and-luft/ (quoting Leibenluft and Luft article).
34
Id.
35
Cf. Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road,
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2 (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056
/NEJMp1013404 (warning of the risks of “‘overinclusive’ ACOs . . . composed of an
unduly large proportion of the hospitals or physicians in their markets” and
suggesting the federal government not certify ACOs for the MSSP “that are likely to
inhibit the development of competing ACOs or that will otherwise impede
competition in the private insurance market,” which, among other things, “would
constrain large hospitals [in most regions of the country] from forming ACOs with
rival hospitals”).
33
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the state action doctrine would immunize the ACOs’ conduct in
furtherance of the pilot, as discussed in Section IV.B below. This
section reviews the requirements for clinical integration and state
action immunity and identifies ways New Jersey may structure its
Medicaid ACOs to mitigate the risks of anticompetitive conduct and
thus antitrust liability.
A. Clinical Integration
Not all collaboration among competitors triggers antitrust
36
alarms. Indeed, some increased transparency among competitors
regarding quality and pricing, for example, has the potential to
37
increase competition. The Agencies have issued guidelines to help
distinguish which types of collaboration are permissible and which
38
pose too great a threat to competition.
One form of collaboration among potential competitors that
may survive an antitrust challenge is when competing health care
providers clinically integrate their care delivery. The Agencies have
recognized that clinical integration of health care providers has the
potential to result in significant procompetitive efficiencies, such as
39
lowering prices or improving quality. In the Statements of Antitrust
36

BURKE ET AL., supra note 22, at 1.
Id. at 3. Rather than a problem, some scholars believe integration is “an
important solution for improving quality and cost in the fee-for-service health
system.” David Balto, Sr. Fellow, Ctr. for American Progress, The Need for a New
Antitrust Paradigm in Health Care, Statements before the H. Judiciary Comm.,
Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy (Dec. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2010/11/pdf/new_antitrust_paradi
gm_healthcare.pdf.
38
See, e.g., Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Dep’t of Justice
& Fed. Trade Comm’n (Aug. 1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines
/0000.pdf [hereinafter Health Care Statements]; ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; Letter
from Fed. Trade Comm’n on TriState Health Partners, Inc. Advisory Op. to Christi J.
Braun, Esq. (Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter “TriState Health Partners”], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/090413tristateaoletter.pdf;
DOSE
OF
COMPETITION, supra note 30, ch. 2, 36–41; Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared
Savings Program 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter “MSSP Antitrust
Statement”].
39
See GAO, supra note 1, at 5–7. Although financial integration also has
procompetitive potential, New Jersey’s ACO demonstration project does not include
financial integration, and thus it is beyond the scope of this Article. Some states and
the Federal government are including forms of financial integration in their ACO
models, such as risk-sharing. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2,
at 6, 13–14 (describing Minnesota’s Medicaid ACO demonstration that includes risk37
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Enforcement Policy in Health Care (“Health Care Statements”), most
recently updated in 1996, the Agencies broadly described examples
of activities in which physician joint ventures might engage to
40
demonstrate sufficient clinical integration. For example, the joint
venture could implement “an active and ongoing program to
evaluate and modify practice patterns . . . and create a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control
41
costs and ensure quality.”
Specifically, such a program could
include, for example:
(1) establishing mechanisms to monitor and control
utilization of health care services that are designed to
control costs and ensure quality of care; (2) selectively
choosing network physicians who are likely to further these
efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant investment of
capital, both monetary and human, in the necessary
infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed
42
efficiencies.
Through these indicia of clinical integration, the Agencies assess
whether a joint venture’s structure has the capacity and whether
individuals participating in the program have sufficient motivation to
work toward the shared efficiency goals even though there is no
43
shared financial risk to incent behavior.
The Agencies made clear in the Health Care Statements that the
44
examples provided were illustrative and not exhaustive. In a recent
advisory opinion, for example, the FTC also found that the use of
evidence-based practice guidelines and electronic health records
45
constituted evidence of clinical integration.
When an arrangement achieves substantial clinical integration
sharing); see generally Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 19
(noting “that although the FTC has been broadly supportive of efforts to form
networks relying on clinical integration, some within the agency hold the view that
financial integration offers a more reliable incentive to produce efficiencies
necessary to justify enhanced opportunities to exercise market power”).
40
See Health Care Statements, supra note 38, at 90–91.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See TriState Health Partners, supra note 38, at 15.
44
Id. at § B.1, Statement 8.
45
GAO, supra note 1, at 12 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION FOR
GREATER ROCHESTER INDEPENDENT PRACTICE ASSOCIATION, INC. (2007)); see also TAYLOR
BURKE & SARA ROSENBAUM, ALIGNING FORCES FOR QUALITY, ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 5 (Mar. 2010),
https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/810/57509.pdf?sequence=1
(summarizing key indicia of clinical integration recognized by the Agencies).
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such that it is likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit
consumers, and when it is reasonably necessary to realize the procompetitive benefits of the integration, the Agencies will not presume
46
that the agreement is per se illegal. Instead, they will apply the rule
of reason to review the legality of the arrangement:
A rule of reason analysis evaluates whether the
collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if
so, whether the collaboration’s potential procompetitive
efficiencies are likely to outweigh those effects. The greater
the likely anticompetitive effects, the greater the likely
efficiencies must be for the collaboration to pass muster
47
under the antitrust laws.
As its name suggests, reasonableness is at the core of this factintensive analysis.
The FTC and DOJ recently concluded in a joint Statement of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(“MSSP Antitrust Statement”) that the eligibility criteria for the
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) authorized by the
Affordable Care Act “are broadly consistent with the indicia of
clinical integration that the Agencies previously set forth in the
48
Health Care Statements” and other agency advice. Thus, as Kevin
Outterson summarized, “[i]f a provider is clinically integrated
enough to qualify as a Medicare ACO, that’s good enough for
49
antitrust law too.” As discussed below, the Agencies’ MSSP Antitrust
Statement is instructive for New Jersey because there are significant
similarities, albeit some striking differences as well, between New
Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot and the MSSP.
The MSSP promotes the formation of ACOs serving Medicare
46

GAO, supra note 1, at 6–8.
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027 (Oct. 28, 2011).
48
Id.; see generally Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 18
(describing DOJ and FTC’s MSSP Antitrust Statement as “a modest relaxation of
antitrust standards previously announced by the agencies”).
49
Kevin Outterson, The Substance of the ACO Antitrust Rules, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com
/wordpress/the-substance-of-the-aco-antitrust-rules/; see also Greaney, Regulators as
Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 20 (observing that “the agencies’ deference to
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) regulatory standards [on the
issue of clinical integration] marks a striking departure from their customary
practice of evaluating competitive issues based on the specific conditions obtaining
in individual circumstances and a general aversion to administrative regulation of
markets”).
47
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50

fee-for-service beneficiaries. Like New Jersey Medicaid ACOs, MSSP
ACOs share a portion of cost savings they realize if the ACO satisfies
quality performance standards established by the Secretary of Health
51
and Human Services.
The MSSP has a number of eligibility
requirements, including that the ACO have:
(1) a formal legal structure that allows the ACO to receive
and distribute payments for shared savings; (2) a leadership
and management structure that includes clinical and
administrative processes; (3) processes to promote
evidence-based medicine and patient engagement; (4)
reporting on quality and cost measures; and (5)
52
coordinated care for beneficiaries.
Because organizations that meet the MSSP eligibility
requirements “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements
intended to improve the quality, and reduce the costs, of providing
medical and other health care services through their participants’
53
joint efforts,” the Agencies will not presume that joint price
negotiations or other anticompetitive conduct by these joint ventures
are per se illegal. Instead, they
will treat joint negotiations with private payers as reasonably
necessary to an ACO’s primary purpose of improving health
care delivery, and will afford rule of reason treatment to an
ACO that meets [the MSSP] eligibility requirements for,
and participates in, the Shared Savings Program and uses
the same governance and leadership structures and clinical
and administrative processes it uses in the Shared Savings
54
Program to serve patients in commercial markets.
Thus, even though the MSSP only involves the Medicare
markets, the Agencies recognized “that ACOs may generate
opportunities for health care providers to innovate in both the
Medicare and commercial markets and achieve for many other
consumers the benefits Congress intended for Medicare beneficiaries

50

See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, §
3022, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-52, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(B).
52
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027 (citing The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99
(2010); Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 42
C.F.R. § 425 (2011)).
53
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027–28.
54
Id. at 67,028.
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55

through the [MSSP].” Thus, their guidance outlined how health
care providers could “form procompetitive ACOs that participate in
56
both the Medicare and commercial markets.”
In doing so, however, the Agencies indicated that they would be
evaluating data regarding cost, utilization, and quality metrics for
each MSSP ACO to assess “whether the [MSSP] eligibility criteria
have required a sufficient level of clinical integration to produce cost
57
savings and quality improvements.”
The Agencies also signaled
their willingness to consider alternative indicia of clinical
58
integration.
The most striking difference between the MSSP and New Jersey’s
Medicaid ACO arguably is market concentration.
The MSSP
Antitrust Statement established a safety zone for clinically integrated
MSSP ACOs “that are highly unlikely to raise significant competitive
concerns and, therefore, will not be challenged by the Agencies
59
under the antitrust laws, absent extraordinary circumstances.” To
come within the safety zone,
independent [MSSP] ACO participants that provide the
same service (a “common service”) must have a combined
share of 30 percent or less of each common service in each
participant’s [primary service area “PSA”], wherever two or
more [MSSP] ACO participants provide that service to
60
patients from that PSA.
This is in sharp contrast to New Jersey’s requirement that one
hundred percent of hospitals and at least seventy-five percent of
primary care providers in the ACO’s designated area support the
61
Medicaid ACO. In addition, the MSSP requires that any hospital or
ambulatory surgery center (ASC) that participates in an MSSP ACO
55

Id. at 67,026.
Brill, supra note 26, at 5; accord SHARIS A. POZEN, ACTING ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN.,
ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND HEALTH CARE: A PRESCRIPTION
FOR HIGH QUALITY, AFFORDABLE CARE, REMARKS AS PREPARED FOR THE WORLD ANNUAL
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN HEALTH CARE 16 (Mar. 19,
2012), available at http://html.documation.com/cds/HEALTH12/Support/PDFs/310.pdf.
57
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.
58
Id.
59
Id. Even MSSP ACOs falling within the safety zone could face antitrust
challenges based on extraordinary circumstances, “such as collusive behavior or
exchanges of pricing or other competitively sensitive information with respect to the
sale of competing services outside the ACO.” Id. at 67,028 n.24.
60
Id. at 67,028. The Final Antitrust Statement provides additional instructions
on how to define and calculate PSAs and common services. Id.
61
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(3).
56
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must be non-exclusive to the ACO to fall within the safety zone,
62
regardless of its share of the PSA.
The MSSP Antitrust Statement also identifies conduct ACOs
should avoid to mitigate antitrust concerns. For one, it recommends
that all ACOs, regardless of market share or other indications of
market power, should avoid the “improper exchanges of prices or
other competitively sensitive information among competing
participants [that] could facilitate collusion and reduce competition
63
in the provision of services outside the ACO.”
The Agencies also identified the following four types of conduct
that ACOs with market shares above the safety zones (or other
indications of possible market power) may wish to avoid because they
64
could raise competitive concerns :
(1) Preventing or discouraging private payers from
directing or incentivizing patients to choose certain
providers, including providers that do not participate in the
ACO, through “anti-steering,” “anti-tiering,” “guaranteed
inclusion,” “most-favored-nation,” or similar contractual
clauses or provisions.
(2) Tying sales (either explicitly or implicitly through
pricing policies) of the ACO’s services to the private payer’s
purchase of other services from providers outside the ACO
(and vice versa), including providers affiliated with an ACO
participant (e.g., an ACO should not require a purchaser to
contract with all of the hospitals under common ownership
with a hospital that participates in the ACO).
(3) Contracting on an exclusive basis with ACO physicians,
hospitals, ASCs, or other providers, thereby preventing or
discouraging those providers from contracting with private
payers outside the ACO, either individually or through
other ACOs or analogous collaborations.
(4) Restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to
62

MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028–29. The Final Antitrust
Statement provides guidance on what it means for an ACO participant to be nonexclusive to the ACO. Id. at 67,028. The Agencies also outlined exceptions to the
safety zone requirements when an ACO’s PSA share exceeds thirty percent in rural
areas, or because a dominant provider performs a service that no other MSSP ACO
participant provides in that PSA. Id. at 67,029. These exceptions also include nonexclusive participation requirements. Id.
63
Id.
64
While these activities could have anticompetitive effects, the Agencies
recognized that they also could be competitively neutral or even procompetitive, and
thus the antitrust analysis will depend on the particular facts of the situation. Id. at
67,029–30.

RAGONE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1456

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/22/2012 1:39 PM

[Vol. 42:1443

its health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and
performance information to aid enrollees in evaluating and
selecting providers in the health plan, if that information is
similar to the cost, quality, efficiency, and performance
65
measures used in the Shared Savings Program.
Although the MSSP Antitrust Statement does not directly apply
66
to New Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs, its analytical principles should.
Consistent with their desire “to maximize and foster opportunities for
ACO innovation and better health for patients,” the Agencies
specifically acknowledged that “[t]he analytical principles underlying
the Policy Statement also would apply to various ACO initiatives
undertaken by the Innovation Center within [the Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services in HHS] as long as those ACOs are
67
substantially clinically or financially integrated.” While New Jersey’s
pilot is not sponsored by the Innovation Center, the Agencies have
indicated that they “support and applaud physicians, hospitals, and
other providers when they find precompetitive, innovative ways to
control costs and improve the quality of health care” and
“encourage[] legitimate endeavors among health care providers to
68
improve quality and control costs.” Relatedly, in recent interviews
by the General Accounting Office, Agency officials defended the
sufficiency of their guidance on clinical integration in part because
69
they do not want to be “overly prescriptive.”
Rather, they
recognized that there are numerous and evolving ways to clinically
integrate, and they intentionally “made the guidance sufficiently
broad to account for new types of clinically integrated collaborative
70
arrangements.”
These comments suggest the Agencies will treat
New Jersey’s innovative approach to helping its most vulnerable
71
patients similarly to how they treat federal pilots and innovations.
Applying the principles in the MSSP Antitrust Statement, there
65

Id. at 67,029 (internal footnote omitted).
Id. at 67,027.
67
Id. at 67,026 & n.7.
68
POZEN, supra note 56, at 1–2, 12.
69
GAO, supra note 1, at 11.
70
Id. at 11–12; see generally A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 30, at 21
(recommending that private payers, governments, and providers experiment with
payment methods to align “providers’ incentives with consumers’ interests in lower
prices, quality improvements, and innovation”).
71
See also BURKE & ROSENBAUM, supra note 45, at 5 (observing that “the ACO
model aligns with longstanding antitrust policies, the aim of which has been to not
stand in the way of innovative and adequate health care financial and clinical
integration arrangements”).
66
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is a strong basis to conclude that the Agencies will apply rule of
reason analysis to New Jersey’s demonstration project, as there are a
number of similarities between the programs.
Both involve
independent providers collaborating with the goal of improving care
while reducing costs.
These providers continue to receive
reimbursement for their services and potentially receive only a
portion of any shared savings they realize through efficiencies. Both
systems require clinical integration to achieve these efficiencies and
measure quality and patient satisfaction to ensure neither suffers as a
result of the economic savings.
Indeed, the MSSP eligibility
requirements, which the Agencies found to be broadly consistent
with their clinical integration standards, mirror to a large degree
those that apply to New Jersey Medicaid ACOs. The New Jersey pilot,
like the MSSP, requires ACOs to have, among other attributes: (1)
formal legal structures that allow the ACO to receive and distribute
payments for shared savings; (2) a leadership and management
structure that includes clinical and administrative processes; (3)
processes to promote patient engagement; (4) reporting on quality
72
and cost measures; and (5) coordinated care.
In addition, New
Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs include a number of features that should
improve clinical collaboration, such as using electronic health
records, electronic prescribing, and a range of specialists to address a
73
broad range of medical issues. Thus, the Agencies should conclude
that New Jersey Medicaid ACOs warrant rule of reason review because
they “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to
improve the quality, and reduce the costs, of providing medical and
74
other health care services through their participants’ joint efforts.”
There are differences between the programs, however, that may
impact the rule of reason balancing. Perhaps the most challenging
feature of New Jersey’s demonstration project, from an antitrust
perspective, will be its requirement that all hospitals and at least
seventy-five percent of primary care providers in the ACO’s defined
75
region support the ACO.
Although the New Jersey law is nonexclusive to the extent that providers may associate with other ACOs,
76
it permits only one Medicaid ACO in each geographic region.
Thus, the Medicaid ACO will have one hundred percent of the
72
73
74
75
76

See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.4–8.5.
See §§ 30:4D-8.4(c), 8.5(b).
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027–28 (Oct. 28, 2011).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(3).
See § 30:4D-8.4(b).
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hospital market share and at least seventy-five percent of the primary
care provider market share for Medicaid patients in a designated
area. Despite the strong indicia of clinical integration built into New
Jersey’s design, “even if an arrangement is clinically integrated, it can
77
still be condemned under the rule of reason if it has market power.”
New Jersey thus should be prepared to demonstrate that its network
of providers is not over-inclusive.
New Jersey can respond that the market share requirements in
its legislation are ancillary to the main goal of improving
coordination and care while reducing costs. The Medicaid markets
in New Jersey are broken. There are inadequate numbers of
78
providers, and there is little to no coordination among them. As the
Camden Coalition of Health Care Providers has maintained,
Medicaid ACOs make sense for New Jersey because there is a “very
fragmented provider, hospital, and payer marketplace. Medicaid
patients are highly concentrated in urban, impoverished cities, with a
high percentage covered by government-sponsored health
79
plans . . . .”
There is a strong argument that the market share
requirements are necessary to bring fragmented providers together
to try to improve access to and the quality of care while realizing
80
efficiencies.
77

BURKE & ROSENBAUM, supra note 45, at 7.
See generally LEGAL SERVS. OF N.J. POVERTY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POVERTY
BENCHMARKS 2012: ASSESSING NEW JERSEY’S PROGRESS IN COMBATING POVERTY 88 (May
2012),
available
at
http://www.lsnj.org/PDFs/budget/Benchmarks2012.pdf
(“Because [New Jersey Medicaid physician reimbursement] rates are so low, very few
physicians participate as Medicaid providers. This means that, while many Medicaid
recipients theoretically have health care coverage, they practically have no health
care access.”); Phil Galewitz, Study: Nearly A Third Of Doctors Won’t See New Medicaid
Patients, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Aug. 6, 2012, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories
/2012/august/06/third-of-medicaid-doctors-say-no-new-patients.aspx (reporting that
a recent survey by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that
only forty percent of New Jersey office-based physicians will accept new Medicaid
patients, the lowest rate in the nation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(c)(3) (identifying
among the legislative findings in support of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO
demonstration project that “[t]he current health care delivery and payment system
often fails to provide high quality, cost-effective health care to the most vulnerable
patients residing in New Jersey, many of whom have limited access to coordinated
and primary care services and, therefore, tend to delay care, underutilize preventive
care, seek care in hospital emergency departments or be admitted to hospitals for
preventable problems”).
79
Medicaid ACO Demonstration Projects, CAMDEN COALITION OF HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.camdenhealth.org/?s=Medicaid%20ACO
%20Demonstration%20Projects.
80
See generally Sheffler, supra note 26, at 1493 (noting “potential efficiency
benefits to exclusivity,” such as that “[i]ncreased internal referrals and
78
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The State also can emphasize that its Medicaid ACOs will
develop in geographically contained regions, most likely those that
have high concentrations of Medicaid patients.
The quality
measures, if well-crafted in the regulations, should ensure that the
high market shares do not result in anticompetitive effects on nonprice features of the market, like quality, output, or innovation.
Although there is the risk of spillover of anticompetitive effects into
commercial markets, the risk arguably is less than between Medicare
and commercial markets. The pilot also is for a limited duration,
which should cabin anticompetitive risks from this experiment.
New Jersey should structure its pilot through its regulations to
account for antitrust concerns. Thus, it should implement safeguards
to prevent anticompetitive effects from the ACO’s activities. As
suggested by the MSSP Antitrust Statement, the State should limit
access among and between independent providers to competitively
sensitive information by, for example, prohibiting collusion over
price or other competitively sensitive terms and implementing
firewalls to prevent collusion in the sale of competing services outside
81
of the ACO. Given the market share of New Jersey Medicaid ACOs,
the regulations also should prohibit the four types of behavior that
the Agencies flagged in the MSSP Antitrust Statement as potentially
anticompetitive, to the extent such behavior is relevant to Medicaid
82
markets.
The State could consider requiring training of ACO
leadership and staff about antitrust concerns and clarifying how the
Medicaid ACO will be able to discipline a non-complying provider.
The State may want to collect data on the commercial markets where

communication among dedicated physicians is expected to facilitate coordinated,
clinically integrated, and high-quality care”); CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra
note 2, at 10 (“Other interviewees questioned whether anti-competitive behavior is of
primary concern within Medicaid, given purchasing dynamics and cost drivers for
low-income populations. Given low-levels of Medicaid reimbursement, for-profit,
high-cost hospitals and health systems may be less likely to serve Medicaid
beneficiaries in the first place. Patterns of high, inappropriate hospital and
emergency department utilization are likely the biggest driver of avoidable Medicaid
costs, rather than high per-unit costs. Collaboration among providers may be more
effective in solving what is fundamentally a utilization issue related to unmet health
and social needs, not a cost issue.”). Cf. S. 1580 § 20, 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2012), available at https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Documents/sb1580.intro.pdf
(permitting more than one coordinated care organization to serve a geographic area
if necessary to optimize access and choice).
81
See MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,029 (Oct. 28, 2011);
BURKE, supra note 22, at 12.
82
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

RAGONE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1460

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/22/2012 1:39 PM

[Vol. 42:1443
83

ACOs operate to monitor for evidence of anticompetitive spillover.
In general, the State should endeavor to implement an “active and
ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the
[ACO]’s providers and to create a high degree of interdependence
and cooperation among the providers to control costs and ensure
84
quality.”
Given the clear legislative intent behind the Medicaid ACO
demonstration to encourage clinical integration in the name of
quality improvement at reduced costs, it seems likely that the
Agencies will find that the procompetitive advantages to consumers
of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot outweigh its potential harm to
competition, and that the anticompetitive aspects of the
collaboration are necessary to realize its benefits. The result of the
rule of reason analysis may well depend on how New Jersey structures
its pilot in forthcoming regulations. New Jersey should use this
opportunity to craft its regulations, ideally with Agency input, to
make it more likely and verifiable that procompetitive effects
dominate, which may convince the Agencies that Medicaid ACOs are
a worthy innovation that they want to encourage.
B. State Action Doctrine
Even if the Medicaid ACO does not survive antitrust scrutiny
under the rule of reason analysis, New Jersey specifically intended to
extend its state action immunity from federal antitrust law to its
85
Medicaid ACOs.
Other states also are invoking this doctrine to
86
protect ACOs from federal antitrust challenges.
83

Cf., e.g., Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 28, 29
(noting that several commenters on the MSSP Proposed Rule suggested “ways to
improve detection and analysis of competitive conditions such as collaborative data
collection by CMS and the antitrust agencies, mandating public reporting on the cost
and price of care, and close monitoring of provider pricing in commercial markets”
and suggesting “CMS could make more explicit that it is likely to deny renewal of
authority for ACOs to participate in the MSSP where it finds evidence of spillovers in
the form of price increases and cost shifting to the private sector resulting from
market power”).
84
MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027; see, e.g., H.B. 3650, 76th
Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2011) (may not “solicit, share, or discuss pricing information” at
joint survey or meetings); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.420 (West 2009) (may not
agree “among competing health care providers or health carriers as to the price or
specific level of reimbursement for health care services”).
85
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g); see generally CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGY,
supra note 2, at 5 (noting that “anti-trust issues in Medicaid may be easier [than in
the MSSP context] due to the state-action doctrine”).
86
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.735(1) (West 2011) (declaring legislative
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A state and its officers and agents generally are not subject to
federal antitrust liability when they act to implement state legislation,
87
even when their actions have anticompetitive effects. This immunity
from antitrust liability, often referred to as the Parker immunity
doctrine, is based on principles of federalism and applies when the
state is acting as a sovereign, but not when it is a mere “participant in
88
a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.”
Federalism concerns, however, do not reach private actors.
Thus, where private actors seek shelter from antitrust liability for
their involvement in a state regulatory scheme, courts require proof
that the private actors are acting at the behest of the state and not
simply as a result of private, anticompetitive agreements. The
Supreme Court has a created a “state action doctrine” to define
circumstances in which private market participants are shielded from
federal antitrust laws for otherwise questionable conduct undertaken
pursuant to a state regulatory scheme. Specifically, the Supreme
Court has identified two elements that must be satisfied before
private actors may invoke immunity from antitrust liability. First, the
state must articulate a clear and affirmative policy to allow the
anticompetitive conduct to ensure that the state’s goals, and not
89
simply self-serving goals, are furthered.
Second, the state must
provide active supervision of anticompetitive conduct undertaken by
90
Given that the doctrine permits anticompetitive
private actors.
behavior that otherwise would violate federal policy, it is not
91
surprising that its application is disfavored.
intent to provide immunity from federal antitrust laws to coordinated care
organizations through the state action doctrine); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.420
(West 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2959-a (McKinney 2011) (establishing multipayer patient centered medical home program with state action immunity); NY CLS
Pub. Health § 2999-r (adopting state action immunity for ACO demonstration); see
generally PURINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 8–9 (noting that Vermont and
Washington included language in legislative ACO proposals to provide antitrust
protection to participants); BURKE, supra note 22, at 8–12 (summarizing healthrelated legislation in various states that relies on the state action doctrine).
87
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (finding no congressional intent
for the federal antitrust laws “to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature”); see also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632–33
(1992) (stating that “federal antitrust laws are subject to supersession by state
regulatory programs”).
88
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351–52.
89
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
90
Id.
91
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 636; see generally DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra
note 30, at 28 (warning that “[i]nappropriately broad interpretations” of the state
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Applying the state action doctrine to New Jersey’s demonstration
project, it is likely that New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO legislation satisfies
the first element of the state action test. The Legislature specifically
exempted private Medicaid ACO participants from State antitrust
liability and expressed its intent for private participants to enjoy
immunity from federal antitrust liability “through the state action
92
doctrine.” Whether private participants in New Jersey’s regulatory
scheme will enjoy federal antitrust immunity therefore will depend
on the second element: whether the State actively supervises, through
mechanisms included in the State’s statute and forthcoming
regulations, the potentially anticompetitive private conduct.
As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, the
active supervision requirement “requires that state officials have and
exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private
93
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.” By
requiring the state to exercise sufficient independent judgment and
control, courts ensure that private actors advance the state’s
regulatory agenda and not simply their private interests. “Immunity
is conferred out of respect for ongoing regulation by the State, not
94
out of respect for the economics of price restraint.”
What does not satisfy the active supervision requirement is
clearer from case law than what does. It is not enough for the state to
have a veto over private agreements or just to check the math on the
95
private conduct. Nor is it sufficient for the state to have the ability
to supervise the private conduct if it does not actually engage in
active supervision. The state also may not rely on state judicial review,
at least where the court cannot reach the merits of the private
96
action.
It likely is insufficient for the state to passively review
contracts among competitors, especially if the system for state review
97
essentially establishes “a presumption in favor of approval.”
Rather, the state must get into the “specific details” of the private
behavior; “[a]ctual state involvement, not deference to private
action doctrine can “chill or limit competition in health care markets”).
92
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g).
93
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S at 634 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
94
Id. at 633.
95
Id. at 638.
96
Id. at 638–39.
97
BURKE, supra note 22, at 11 (quoting FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, IN RE MINNESOTA
HOUSE BILL H.F. NO. 120 & SENATE BILL S.F. NO. 203 ADVISORY OPINION (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.ftc/opp/advocacy/V090003.pdf).
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[anticompetitive] arrangements under the general auspices of state
98
The
law, is the precondition for immunity from federal law.”
development and administration of Medicaid ACOs may involve
cooperation among entities that are otherwise competitors in matters
such as business practices and referrals. The cases reviewing the state
action doctrine as applied to some types of potential anticompetitive
behavior provide an indication as to the degree of state oversight
courts will expect of states in the supervision of other types of
behavior.
While the Supreme Court to date has not identified specific
procedural or substantive standards that states must adopt to satisfy
99
the active supervision requirement, the FTC has identified three
elements that it will evaluate in deciding whether the active
supervision prong has been satisfied in a given case:
(1) Development of an adequate factual record, including
notice and opportunity to be heard.
(2) A written decision on the merits.
(3).“[A] specific assessment—both qualitative and
quantitative—of how the private action comports with the
100
substantive standards established by the state legislature.”
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted these elements, the
101
FTC regularly applies them; it would be prudent, then, to anticipate
that these elements will guide evaluation of applications of the state
action doctrine.
In fleshing out the substance of these requirements, the FTC
requires that states engage in a “‘pointed re-examination’ of the
private conduct”:
98

Id.
Supreme Court guidance may be forthcoming because, for the first time in
nearly twenty years, the Court will hear a case this term that concerns the scope of
the state action doctrine, this time in the hospital merger context. See Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4852, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707
(Jun. 25, 2012); Questions Presented, 11-1160 Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe
Putney Health System, Inc., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-01160qp.pdf.
100
TODD J. ZYWICKI ET AL., OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE
ACTION
TASK
FORCE
55
(Sept.
2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
101
See In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (F.T.C. Nov.
20, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/110208commopinion
.pdf (noting that “[a]lthough no single one of these elements is necessarily a
prerequisite for active supervision, the Board has presented no evidence that any of
these elements are satisfied here” and that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the FTC’s
application of these elements in Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Ass’n v. FTC, 199 F.
App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006)).
99
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One asserting the state action defense must demonstrate
that the state agency has ascertained the relevant facts,
examined the substantive merits of the private action,
assessed whether that private action comports with the
underlying statutory criteria established by the state
legislature, and squarely ruled on the merits of the private
action in a way sufficient to establish the challenged
conduct as a product of deliberate state intervention rather
102
than private choice.
Developing an adequate factual record facilitates this pointed reexamination. Thus, the FTC has emphasized the need for the state
to obtain “reliable, timely, and complete” data to permit the state to
evaluate if the private conduct is furthering the Legislative
103
objectives. The FTC similarly has emphasized the need for the state
to conduct periodic reviews of ongoing private conduct with updated
data and not just to permit an initial approval to justify continued
104
immunity. In the FTC’s view, providing notice and an opportunity
to comment to affected communities is integral to this process of
assembling the factual record. As the FTC has stated, “[t]hese
procedural elements . . . are powerful engines for ensuring that
relevant facts—especially those facts that might tend to contradict the
proponent’s contentions—are brought to the state decisionmaker’s
105
attention.”
It is noteworthy that the FTC on several occasions has
criticized a proposed regulatory scheme for not permitting the state
to require submission of additional information needed to facilitate
106
pointed re-examination.
The FTC also places high value on the state supervisor issuing a

102

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT IN IND.
HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMEN, INC., FILE NO. 021-0115, at 4 (F.T.C. Apr. 5,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/indianahouseholdmoversanalysis
.pdf [hereinafter “IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER”].
103
Id. at 6.
104
Id. at 6; see also Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Policy Planning,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Elliott Naishtat, Rep., Tex. H.R.et al. (May 18, 2011),
available at http://html.documation.com/cds/HEALTH12/Support/PDFs/7-1.pdf
(noting lack of required review after health care cooperative’s first year in finding
party seeking immunity had not carried heavy burden).
105
IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT
ORDER, supra note 102, at 7.
106
See, e.g., Letter from Joseph J. Simons, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed.
Trade Comm’n on Alaska S.B. 37 to Lisa Murkowski, Chair, H. Labor & Commerce
Comm., Alaska H.R. (Jan. 18, 2002), available at www.ftc.Gov/be/v020003.htm
[hereinafter “FTC Letter on Alaska S.B. 37”].
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written decision. As it has explained, “[t]hough not essential, the
existence of a written decision is normally the clearest indication that
the [state entity] (1) genuinely has assessed whether the private
conduct satisfies the legislature’s stated standards and (2) has directly
107
taken responsibility for that determination.”
Whether the state is
approving or denying proposed private anticompetitive conduct, the
FTC favors a written decision that provides “analysis and reasoning,
and supporting evidence [regarding whether] the private conduct
108
furthers the legislature’s objectives.”
Whether reduced to writing or not, the FTC’s third active
supervision element looks for a qualitative and quantitative
assessment by the state in considering whether to approve the private
anticompetitive conduct. The FTC looks for evidence of the “steps
the State took in analyzing” the proposed private conduct and “the
109
criterion it used in evaluating” that proposed conduct. Among the
evidence the FTC will consider is “whether the State independently
verified the accuracy of financial data submitted and whether it relied
on accurate and representative samples of data. There should be
evidence that the State has a thorough understanding of the
110
The FTC
consequences of the private parties’ proposed action.”
also looks for evidence that the state reviewed “particular contracts
and fee arrangements . . . to assess whether they comport with State
policy goals . . . and to remedy on an ongoing basis situations that
111
may violate those goals.”
This type of review can be rather
intensive, and the FTC often expresses its concern that states lack the
requisite resources and time to complete the hands-on oversight
112
necessary. For example, it has criticized proposals imposing thirtyand ninety-day time periods for state review, noting that they did not
113
permit the state to extend the time for good cause.
107

IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT
ORDER, supra note 102, at 7.
108
Id.; see also Letter from Joseph. J. Simons, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed.
Trade Comm’n on Ohio H.B. 325 to Dennis Stapleton, Chairman, Ins. Comm., Ohio
H.R. (Oct. 16, 2002), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/ohb325.htm.
109
IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT
ORDER, supra note 102, at 8.
110
Id.
111
Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade
Comm’n to Senators Eric D. Coleman & John A. Kissel, Representatives Gerald Fox
and John W. Hetherington, Conn. Gen. Assemb. (June 8, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/06/110608chc.pdf.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., Letter to Lisa Murkowski, supra note 106; Letter from Susan DeSanti,
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New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO legislation expressly intends for the
State to have oversight over Medicaid ACOs and builds features of
State oversight into the statute. Proposed ACOs must apply to the
State Department of Human Services (DHS) “for certification and
participation in the project,” and DHS must “consult with the
Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) with respect to
114
establishment and oversight of the demonstration project.” DHS is
empowered to deny certification to any applicant that it determines
115
does not meet the various statutory eligibility requirements. Once
certified, a Medicaid ACO must further seek DHS approval of its
gainsharing plan before it may receive and distribute any shared
116
savings. The statute requires DHS, with input from DHSS, to obtain
and review data, including patient experience of care, and consider
various criteria in deciding whether to approve an ACO’s gainsharing
plan, which include substantive standards as well as whether the plan
was “developed with community input and will be made available for
117
inspection by members of the community served by the ACO.” The
statute also empowers DHS to approve amendments to an ACO’s
118
gainsharing plan.
The State is further charged with responsibility
for designing and implementing the ACO application process,
collecting data from ACO participants, and approving a methodology
for calculating cost savings and monitoring health outcomes and
119
quality of care under the pilot.
Each year, DHS, in consultation
with DHSS, shall evaluate the pilot to assess whether there are cost
savings and improvement in the rates of health screening, the
outcomes and hospitalization rates for persons with chronic illnesses,
120
and the hospitalization and readmission rates.
At the completion
of the three-year demonstration project, DHS and DHSS shall
provide an evaluation of the pilot to the Governor and to the
Legislature, including an assessment of whether it should be made a
121
permanent program.
The statute further directs DHS, with input

supra note 111.
114
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.3(a).
115
§ 30:4D-8.4.
116
§§ 30:4D-8.5(a) & § 30:4D-8.7(a).
117
§ 30:4D-8.5(b) & (h).
118
§ 30:4D-8.5(a).
119
§ 30:4D-8.8(a).
120
§ 30:4D-8.9; cf. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 848.060 (West 2011) (requiring
annual renewal of health care collaborative certificate of authority and
determination of approval).
121
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.14.
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from DHSS, to promulgate regulations establishing, among other
things, “the standards for gainsharing plans submitted by Medicaid
ACOs . . . [and] governing the ongoing oversight and monitoring of
the quality of care delivered to Medicaid recipients in the designated
122
areas served by the Medicaid ACOs.”
While the statute establishes a framework for State oversight of
the demonstration project, it may not be sufficient to satisfy the
demanding state action standards. Based on the Agency guidance
reviewed above, there are a number of issues for the State to consider
as it finalizes draft regulations to implement the Medicaid ACO pilot.
A high priority is addressing the need for ongoing monitoring and
oversight. Although the statute requires annual review of the
program as a whole, it does not expressly require ongoing review of
each ACO’s continued eligibility and compliance with the pilot’s
123
objectives. The State needs to be able to monitor the performance
of ACOs after they are certified and their gainsharing plans are
approved or amended to ensure that they continue to comply with
the program’s objectives. To facilitate this oversight, for example, the
State could require ACOs to report annually on the amount,
distribution, and use of savings achieved; quality performance
measures; and patient satisfaction reports. This oversight could keep
an eye on whether there have been any anticompetitive spillover
effects into other markets from the ACO’s activities. The State may
also want to impose an ongoing obligation on ACOs to notify the
State in a timely fashion if they experience any material changes from
what they represented in their applications or gainsharing plans so
the State, as overseer, can evaluate whether these changes affect the
ACO’s eligibility for the pilot.
The state action doctrine not only requires the State to review
the actions of non-state actors, but it also must disapprove of
anticompetitive private party conduct that fails to comply with State
124
policy. The statute is not clear, however, whether the State has any
option other than to approve or disapprove ACO applications and
125
gainsharing plans. The State should clarify the bases on which and
at what points it may take action if a participant or ACO is not
complying with the program’s requirements. For example, the State
122

§ 30:4D-8.15.
§ 30:4D-8.9.
124
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992)).
125
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.4(a), 8.5(b).
123
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may consider whether and in what circumstances it may suspend or
revoke a previously granted certification, impose a remediation plan,
require reapplication, and/or reconsider a previous decision.
Although not necessarily required to, the State also may wish to
adopt some or all of the three factors that the FTC has said it will
consider when analyzing if the active supervision prong has been
126
satisfied. To ensure that it develops an adequate factual record, the
State could require applicants to submit information it will need to
perform qualitative and quantitative assessments, which may include,
for example, information regarding the ACO’s contracts and fee
arrangements and copies of the ACO’s certificate of incorporation
and bylaws. At a minimum, the State should include language giving
it the authority to require applicants to provide additional
information needed to perform its oversight functions. Although the
statute contemplates some opportunity for the public to have notice
of and to comment on ACO formation, the State could clarify what
stages of the ACO formation and approval processes require notice
and comment from the public and how the process will work at each
stage.
The State also should decide whether to require any of its
decisions regarding Medicaid ACOs to be in writing, such as its
decisions regarding the ACO’s application for certification,
gainsharing plan, amendment of the plan, and, if implemented,
annual review of the ACO’s certification. It also would be useful for
the State to require any decision to articulate the reasons and
supporting evidence for its conclusion.
To demonstrate that the State performs a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of the private conduct, the regulations could
require the State to independently verify and analyze the information
supplied by the ACOs. The regulations also could address how,
logistically, the State will implement its oversight obligations. For
example, it could establish the time frames for each stage in the
process. In doing so, the State will have to balance the desire to keep
the ACO certification process moving swiftly with both the reality of
limited State resources and the Agencies’ skepticism that the State
can meaningfully fulfill an oversight function in limited time frames.
The regulations could permit the State to extend the time periods for
good cause.
While there are a variety of options available to the State to
126

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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improve the chances that the Agencies and, ultimately the courts, will
find that the state action doctrine applies, it is unclear how much the
State must do to satisfy the active supervision requirement. It is
notable that the vast majority of available FTC guidance on this prong
involves fact patterns that are distinguishable from Medicaid ACOs
and much more akin to classic price fixing, like doctors seeking to
band together to renegotiate fee schedules or movers collectively
127
setting rates.
It is an open question how the FTC and DOJ will
apply these standards to New Jersey’s demonstration project. As
discussed above, the Federal government has signaled its support of
similar programs that look to bend the cost curve by improving
quality while trimming costs. The pilot includes quality measures and
128
consumer input, which should facilitate State oversight.
Thus, to
the extent possible, New Jersey should seek input from the Agencies
during the regulatory drafting process to inform its decisions about
how to structure its oversight of the pilot.
V. CONCLUSION
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO Demonstration Project raises
significant federal antitrust issues. But it also proposes an innovative
reform that seeks to increase access to better quality health care for
vulnerable populations while reducing costs. The federal antitrust
Agencies share these goals and have committed to working with
innovators to test these proposals. As Sharis A. Pozen, former Acting
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, recently said,
“[t]he ultimate objective is that ACOs and ACO participants commit
to the necessary changes in leadership, management, and clinical
structures and procedures that will lead to real cost containment and
129
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot
quality improvements.”
challenges providers and the community to make this commitment.
127

See, e.g., FTC Letter on Alaska S.B. 37, supra note 106 (commenting on State
bill seeking to permit “competing physicians to engage in collective bargaining with
health plans over fees and other terms”); IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND
WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER, supra note 102 (involving
allegations that an association of seventy movers in Indiana established collective
rates for the transportation of household goods within the State that were agreed
upon by all of its members).
128
Cf. GAO, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that a “key reason” that the MSSP
safety zone is more generous than in the 1996 Health Care Statements was that,
“unlike collaborative arrangements in the private market, ACOs in the [M]SSP are
subject to quality and cost reporting requirements and monitoring that do not exist
for arrangements outside this program”).
129
POZEN, supra note 56, at 17.
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New Jersey should work with the FTC and DOJ to structure its
Medicaid ACO Demonstration Project to minimize the threat of
anticompetitive conduct while maximizing these shared goals.

